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1. Introduction 
Taking stock of a number of related studies
2 conducted within the Bank of Japan, our intention in this 
paper is to discuss the interrelationship between the increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) and the 
performance of the real economy in Japan since the 1990s. 
Since the bursting of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s, NPL problems have been a central 
issue for researchers and policymakers in Japan. It is an issue that includes a whole range of topics, 
such as the extent of the NPLs residing on balance sheets in the financial sector; whether or not there 
was any credit crunch; how bank health should be restored, and whether this should involve injections 
of public funds; and the severity of the adjustment process - say, how far the already high 
unemployment rate would go up - over the course of restructuring. 
Given this wide range of issues (and the limitations of space), we focus our attention on issues that 
relate directly to the interaction between NPLs and the real side of the economy. 
Even within this narrower scope, our coverage in this paper is selective. We do not discuss, for 
instance, the increase in precautionary saving after the 1997-98 banking crises. This is not because 
the negative impact of these was negligibly small. Rather, it is because there is general agreement 
among economists concerning the huge cost associated with these banking crises. Our interest here, 
therefore, is in the more contentious issue of whether, when we abstract from these banking crises, 
there remains a significant link between NPLs and the real economy. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 considers how the performance of the 
real economy affected the emergence of NPLs. Sections 3 to 5 then discuss how the increase in 
NPLs, in turn, distorted the performance of the real economy via malfunctioning in the banking sector. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  Emergence of NPLs 
2.1  Definitions of NPLs 
First of all, we briefly review the definitions and recent status of NPLs. 
For those who are not familiar with the NPL problems in Japan, definitions of NPLs have often been 
the source of confusion. This is because there are at least three definitions that are referred to, and 
these definitions have been changed over time (Figures 1 and 2). 
•  Risk management loans and loans disclosed under the Financial Reconstruction Law (FRL) 
classification are officially published NPLs in the sense that they are based on the criteria 
specified by a law or bylaw. Although they have different breakdowns, their two definitions 
                                                       
1  We are grateful to Yumi Saita for her assistance and for allowing us to make use of the results of her research. The views 
expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan. 
2  We leave technical details to background papers (Nagahata and Sekine (2002), Sekine et al (2003), Saita and 
Sekine (2001)).  
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broadly coincide, and hence produce similar figures for outstanding loans (¥34.8 trillion and 
¥35.3 trillion, respectively, at end-March 2003). 
•  Loans subject to self-assessment are classified, depending upon borrower creditworthiness, 
in line with guidelines (the “Inspection Manual”) produced by the Financial Services Agency 
(FSA): 
–  Loans that, according to the terms of the self-assessment, are to “bankrupt” and “de 
facto bankrupt” borrowers correspond to “unrecoverable or valueless” loans under the 
FRL classification, while those to borrowers that the self-assessment classifies as “in 
danger of bankruptcy” correspond to “risk” loans under the FRL classification. 
–  Loans to borrowers classified in the self-assessment as needing “attention” include a 
subcategory of loans to borrowers needing “special attention”. Loans to borrowers that 
“need special attention” roughly correspond to loans requiring “special attention” under 
the FRL classification.
3 Since the figure for loans to borrowers that “need attention” but 
not “special attention” is substantial, outstanding loans to borrowers whom the self-
assessment categorises as of or below the standard of needing “attention” 
(¥90.1 trillion at the end of March 2003) far exceed the apparently comparable figures 
for risk management loans and FRL classified loans. 
•  These definitions have substantially changed over time. As summarised in Figure 3, the 
criteria became tougher and their coverage became wider in response to public demand for 
better disclosure. 
In this paper, in order to avoid ambiguity, when we refer to NPLs we are talking about risk 
management loans and FRL classified loans. As explained above, these broadly correspond to loans 
to borrowers classified in the self-assessment as being of or below the standard of needing “special 
attention”. We consider loans to borrowers that “need attention” but not “special attention” to be quasi-
NPLs. 
In what follows, we define borrower firms’ ratings by reclassifying the self-assessment ratings to get 
(i) “normal” borrowers (these remain the same as in the self-assessment); (ii) “doubtful” borrowers 
(those classified within the self-assessment as needing “attention” but not “special attention”); and 
(iii) “bad” borrowers (those who “need special attention”, or are “in danger of bankruptcy”, “de facto 
bankrupt”, or “bankrupt” according to the self-assessment ratings). As described above, this category 
of “bad” borrowers basically captures NPLs, while “doubtful” borrowers correspond to quasi-NPLs. 
Although declining, NPLs remain high. Under the current government initiatives, banks are required to 
dispose of loans that fall into or below the category “in danger of bankruptcy” within three years of their 
emergence.
4 By active sales of their NPLs (including to the Resolution and Collection Corporation) 
and debt forgiveness at times of corporate restructuring, banks had decreased their risk management 
loans in March 2003 by more than ¥8 trillion from a year earlier (Bank of Japan (2003a)). However, the 
NPL ratio (FRL classified loans divided by total loans outstanding) of major banks in March 2003 was 
7.2%, which was still significantly higher than 4%, the target ratio to be achieved by March 2005 (FSA, 
“Program for Financial Revival”, October 2002). 
2.2  Link from the real economy to NPLs 
So far, despite active debate in the media, there is little empirical research available relating the 
performance of the real economy to the emergence of NPLs. Some argue that it is the long-lasting 
recession that has been responsible for the increase in NPLs. Others appeal to the debt-deflation 
theory of Irving Fisher (1933) and insist on deflation (in the sense of a decline in general prices) as the 
                                                       
3  To be precise, the figure for loans to borrowers whom the self-assessment determines as requiring special attention is larger 
than the comparable figure for FRL classified special attention loans. This is because the former counts loans to borrowers 
in their entirety, even if only part of these borrowings requires special attention. 
4  “Emergency Economic Package”, April 2001. Banks are also required to dispose of 50% of these loans within one year of 
their emergence and about 80% within two years (FSA, “Measures for a Stronger Financial System”, April 2002).  
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prime cause. The lack of adequate empirical research prevents economists from reaching any 
consensus on this issue. 
However, it seems obvious that the sharp fall in asset prices, especially land prices,
5 is one of the 
dominant causes of NPLs. Risk management loans are heavily concentrated in real estate related 
industries, ie in construction and real estate, as well as among retailers and wholesalers (Figure 4).
6 
During the bubble era of the late 1980s, firms in these industries were aggressive in their purchases of 
real estate properties, including countryside forests in order to develop then-lucrative resort areas 
such as golf courses (Figure 5).
7 The collapse of land prices after the bursting of the bubble severely 
impaired their balance sheets and made some of them insolvent. 
In order to further investigate this issue, we believe that we need to exploit cross-sectional information 
on individual firms such as borrower firms’ ratings (good/doubtful/bad) and their financial condition. For 
instance, the following calibration would create consistent data for NPLs and enable us to see the 
effects of the real economy. As seen in the previous section, due to frequent changes in the 
definitions, there is no such time series, which at least partly explains the scarcity of empirical 
research on this issue. 
(i)  First, a cross section model of individual borrower firms’ current ratings is estimated by 
regressing them on various financial indicators obtained from their income statements and 
balance sheets. 
  More specifically, as such a cross section model, we believe it promising to use a nested 
logit model whose tree structure is as described below. A nested logit model is desirable 
because it is expected to fit the actual ratings better than an ordered probit model, which is 
the alternative often used in the related literature. Improved fit is likely to be achieved 
courtesy of one of the advantages of the nested logit model, namely that we can use 
different sets of explanatory variables for each nest, ie the explanatory variables for the 
choice between “normal” and “doubtful/bad” could differ from those used when looking at the 










(ii)  Then, individual borrower firms’ ratings in the past are calibrated, using the coefficients 
obtained in the above step and historical data on selected explanatory variables. 
  Provided that the estimated nested logit model offers a reasonable fit, the calibration gives 
us an insight into the ratings firms would have received had they been subject to the recent 
borrower classification criteria. In providing such ratings, the calibration creates consistent 
data for NPLs, where “consistent” means NPLs are classified according to the same criteria. 
                                                       
5  Land price indices in the Tokyo metropolitan area have fallen to 40-50% of their 1992 levels see Figure 13. In fact, hedonic 
estimation of judicial auction prices reveals that the price of land used as collateral for NPLs has fallen even more sharply 
(Saita (2003)). 
6  In one of the few pieces of empirical research on this subject, Ueda (2000) finds a significant correlation between the NPL 
ratios of individual banks and the fluctuation of land prices in the capital cities of prefectures where banks’ headquarters are 
located. 
7  Trading houses belong to the retail and wholesale industries. In addition to various goods and services, they are also known 
to deal actively in real estate properties. See Tachibana and Sekine (2003) on how to estimate land investment carried out 
by these industries.  
BIS Papers No 22  109
 
Note that such data in the longer term do not exist in reality, because, as seen in Figure 3, 
aggregated figures for self-assessments are only available from 1997, and there have even 
been changes since then, with the criteria for self-assessment said to have changed when 
the “Inspection Manual” was introduced. 
As a very preliminary stage of research, we have estimated the cross section model using the most 
recently available data and calibrated borrower firms’ ratings in the 1990s in the way described above. 
We find that, in the nested logit model, the choice between “normal” and “doubtful/bad” mostly 
depends on procyclical variables obtained from income statements (eg sales growth, the interest 
coverage ratio), while the choice between “doubtful” and “bad” mostly depends on non-cyclical 
variables obtained from balance sheets (eg the debt/asset ratio, which mainly reflects land price 
developments because the asset values that constitute its denominator are revalued at market prices). 
As a result, the share of the calibrated numbers of “doubtful” is characterised by cyclical fluctuation 
resembling business cycles in Japan, while the share of “bad” borrowers steadily increases somewhat. 
Calculating transition matrices with the calibrated borrower ratings, it turns out that the matrix in 
recessionary periods significantly differs from that in expansionary periods.
8 
In sum, we tentatively conclude that two different real factors are responsible for the increase in NPLs. 
One is a trend factor, which directly affected the numbers of “bad” borrowers. The other is a cyclical 
factor, which acted to increase NPLs indirectly, by increasing quasi-NPLs. Given that (i) NPLs have 
been concentrated in real estate related industries, and (ii) the choice between “doubtful” and “bad” in 
the nested logit model is dependent upon balance sheet variables like the debt/asset ratio, the trend 
factor is thought to be associated with the deterioration in firms’ balance sheets that accompanied the 
fall in land prices. Meanwhile, the fall in land prices is thought to have reflected the bursting of the 
bubble as well as ongoing structural changes. 
3.  Firms’ balance sheet condition vs banks’ balance sheet condition 
In Sections 3 and 4, we discuss how the increase in NPLs affected real economic activity in Japan. 
First, in Section 3, we examine the respective roles played by firms’ and banks’ balance sheet 
condition in determining firm investment and bank lending. Then, in Section 4, we consider another 
problem associated with NPLs, namely forbearance lending. 
It is an issue of some contention among economists whether or not banks, faced with a deterioration in 
their balance sheet condition, restrained their lending and so hampered investment. Theoretically, as 
pointed out by Krugman (1998), banks with damaged balance sheets might have an incentive to 
favour risky projects - this is known as “gambling for resurrection”. In opposition to this, Van den 
Heuvel (2001) shows how a bank with an impaired balance sheet might decrease its lending in order 
to satisfy the risk-based capital requirements of the Basel Accord. There is also an empirical difficulty 
in distinguishing the respective roles played by firms’ and banks’ balance sheet condition. Identification 
of distinct roles for each is problematic because, at the macro level, firms’ balance sheets and banks’ 
balance sheets are different sides of the same coin. 
In order to overcome this empirical difficulty, we rely on micro panel data. At the level of a diversified 
micro data set we can distinguish between the roles of firms’ and banks’ balance sheets, provided that 
there is a sufficient number of firms whose own balance sheets are in good condition but whose main 
banks’ balance sheets are not, and vice versa. 
The basic strategy below is to augment conventional forms of firm investment and bank lending 
functions with variables that represent firms’ and banks’ balance sheet condition, and then to check 
whether coefficients on these variables are significant.
9 
                                                       
8  Using Moody’s and S&P’s data, Nickell et al (2000) and Bangia et al (2002) find that the transition matrices differ depending 
on whether a given business cycle period is expansionary or recessionary. 
9  See Chatelain et al (2001) and Ehrmann et al (2001) for recent examples of firm investment functions and bank lending 
functions using micro panel data.  
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3.1 Firm  investment 
We estimate the following error-correction specification of a firm investment function, using micro 
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where Iit is the real investment of firm i at time t; Kit is its real capital (small k denotes its logarithm); yit 
is the log of its real output; jit is the log of its user cost of capital; CFit is its cash flow divided by its 
nominal capital; and uit is an error term. ∆ denotes the first difference operator. 
Firms’ and banks’ balance sheet condition is represented by the following variables. First, each firm’s 
balance sheet condition is captured by its debt/asset ratio, D/A, where assets A are revalued at market 
prices using the perpetual inventory method. Then, each bank’s balance sheet condition is captured 
by an adjusted capital adequacy ratio, Cap, which takes into account NPLs, capital gains/losses and 
deferred tax assets.
10 For each firm, Cap is calculated as a weighted average of its main banks’ Cap, 
where the weights represent the main banks’ shares of long-term loans. Main banks are defined to be 
the three city/long-term credit banks whose long-term loans are the largest. 
Following Gibson (1997), we split our sample into two subsamples according to whether or not firms 
have ever issued bonds. Non-bond-issuing firms are supposed to face tighter financial constraints than 
bond-issuing firms, because they have fewer external funding options and are hence more dependent 
on bank lending. 
Figure 6 summarises the estimation results. Insignificance of the cash flow terms aside, signs and 
sizes of estimated coefficients are largely in line with prior expectations.
11 The points to be noted are: 
•  Firms’ balance sheet condition, D/A, is negative and significant for both bond-issuing and 
non-bond-issuing firms; while 
•  Banks’ balance sheet condition, Cap, is positive and significant only for non-bond-issuing 
firms. 
What this implies is that, after the collapse of the asset price bubble, firms restrained their investment 
in order to reduce the burden of existing debts. Moreover, it indicates that, faced with erosion of their 
capital adequacy, banks restrained their lending and hence hampered the investment of firms without 
access to the capital market. This finding is consistent with the story of a “credit crunch”. 
In Figure 7, contributions to changes in I/K–1 are calculated from the sample averages of the variables 
of interest (D/A and Cap) and their coefficients. Firms’ balance sheet condition is found to have had a 
relatively large negative impact throughout the 1990s. Meanwhile, the negative impact of 
banks’ balance sheet condition is particularly large for non-bond-issuing firms during the FY1996-98 
subperiod, which spans the occurrence of the banking crises in Japan. However, even prior to that 
subperiod, a non-negligible negative impact is observed for non-bond-issuing firms. 
In short, NPLs hampered firm investment via a deterioration in both firms’ and banks’ balance sheet 
condition.
12 In a sense, the deterioration in banks’ balance sheet condition may be said to have had a 
propagation effect, because it distorted the investment of bank-dependent firms, even when the 
balance sheets of the latter were in good condition. 
                                                       
10 (Shareholders’  equity  +  capital gains/losses from securities  + loan-loss  provisioning – risk  management  assets – deferred 
tax assets)/assets. 
11  See Nagahata and Sekine (2002) for a discussion of the insignificant cash flow terms. Also, see Bank of Japan, Research 
and Statistics Department (2003) for a more general exposition of weak business fixed investment in the 1990s. 
12  Ogawa (2001) and Sekine (1999) also find both firms’ and banks’ balance sheet condition mattered for firm investment.  
BIS Papers No 22  111
 
3.2 Bank  lending 
In order to check the robustness of the above findings, it would be desirable to see whether a similar 
story holds for bank lending. In the context of a putative credit crunch, it is important to check whether 
deteriorating bank balance sheets acted to reduce bank lending, something which is not directly 
observed in the above estimation. 
The role of bank balance sheets can be checked by estimating the following reduced-form bank 
lending function using micro panel data on banks: 
it t i t i
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where lit is the log of outstanding loans of bank i at time t; dit is the log of outstanding deposits; rt is the 
short-term interest rate; DIit is the diffusion index of business conditions in the survey conducted on 
firms; and Liqit is the bank’s liquidity ratio.
13 Again, to capture firms’ and banks’ balance sheet 
condition, firms’ debt/asset ratios (D/A)it and banks’ adjusted capital adequacy ratios Capit are 
included. Both DIit and (D/A)it for each bank are obtained as weighted averages of D/A and DI at the 
industry level, where the weights are the industry shares of outstanding loans at each bank. 
We have preliminarily estimated the above function using data on individual banks in the 1990s. All 
the long-run coefficients are found to be significant and have expected signs - thus that on D/A is 
negative and significant and that on Cap is positive and significant. Calculating contributions to annual 
growth in bank lending, using the sample averages of variables, movements in both D/A and Cap 
make large negative contributions to bank lending, just as in the investment function above.
14 
These results are in line with the findings for firm investment, in that both firms’ and banks’ balance 
sheet condition matters. 
3.3  Implications for monetary policy 
In the above firm investment function, the coefficients on the interest rates are negative and 
significant. For instance, in Figure 6, most of the user costs of capital ( j is its level and ∆j is its first 
difference), which are calculated from the yield on 10-year JGBs, are negative and significant. Also in 
the above bank lending function, the change in short-term interest rate ∆rt is found to be negative and 
significant. 
These findings imply that a conventional transmission channel was working even after the bubble 
burst. This is contrary to the widely held belief that monetary policy was largely ineffective - a belief 
borne out, for example, by the simple correlation between changes in loans outstanding and the call 
rate, which turned out to be positive after the bubble burst (Figure 8). Our finding suggests, however, 
that the positive impact of lowering the interest rate was obscured by the negative impact of the 
deterioration in firms’ and banks’ balance sheet condition. 
In order to further investigate the issue, we can re-estimate the bank lending function by splitting the 
sample period into two subperiods, say at 1997 Q4. The latter subperiod contains the introduction of 
both the zero interest rate policy (1999 Q1) and the quantitative easing policy (2001 Q1). 
We preliminarily find that the coefficient on the short-term interest rate is negative and significant in the 
former subperiod but it turns out to be positive and significant in the latter subperiod (ie interest rate 
cuts acted to decrease bank lending). Even when we replace the short-term interest rate with a 
quantitative measure such as base money, the coefficient on base money is negative and significant 
in the latter subperiod (ie increases in base money act to decrease bank lending). 
                                                       
13  (Cash and deposits + call loans + government securities)/debts outstanding. 
14  Explanatory variables in levels (DI, D/A, Liq and Cap) are subject to normalisation. This makes use of either their historical 
averages or of constant terms obtained from regressions on other macro variables such as the real growth rate.  
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Although we cannot dismiss the possibility that the wrong signs are due to some misspecification, this 
result coincides with Kimura et al (2003) and Fujiwara (2003), who also fail to find theoretically 
consistent monetary policy effects in recent years. 
4. Forbearance  lending 
Recently economists have been paying more attention to another phenomenon associated with NPLs, 
namely “forbearance lending” (or what Peek and Rosengren (2003) term “ever-greening policy” and 
Caballero et al (2003) term “zombie lending”). Japanese banks are said to have been reluctant to write 
off NPLs and to have rolled over their lending, even in cases where there was little prospect of the 
borrower firm being able to repay the loans extended. 
There are several theoretical models which try to reveal why or under what conditions banks have an 
incentive to engage in forbearance lending. In reality, some or all of these models may well be thought 
to hold at the same time. This is because, as seen below, they are not mutually inconsistent. 
•  Kobayashi and Kato (2001), along somewhat similar lines to Krugman (1998), argue that a 
change in banks’ risk preferences makes them softer about providing additional loans. Once 
a bank increases its exposure to a firm, the bank becomes risk-loving and begins to control 
that firm as if it were a dominant shareholder. 
•  Sakuragawa (2002) develops a model in which a bank without sufficient loan loss 
provisioning has an incentive to disguise its true balance sheet so as to satisfy the minimum 
capital requirement. 
•  Berglöf and Roland (1997), applying a soft budget constraint model, consider a game 
between a bank and a firm in which the bank continues to provide loans to the firm even 
after the latter’s liquidation value plunges following a decrease in asset prices. 
•  Baba (2001), using real option theory, shows that uncertainties associated with the write-off 
of NPLs - such as the reinvestment return from freeing up funds by write-off, the liquidation 
loss, and the possible implementation of a government subsidy scheme, etc - induce banks 
to delay writing off NPLs. 
In order to see whether banks have been engaging in forbearance lending, we investigate the 
relationship between firms’ debt/asset ratios D/A and their outstanding loans. In a preliminary 
estimation of a cross section model in Section 2, we find that loans to firms with higher debt/asset 
ratios tend to become NPLs. If banks have indeed been engaging in forbearance lending, loans would 
have been apt to increase to firms whose debt/asset ratios were above a certain level. 
More specifically, using micro panel data on 580 firms, we test the above inference by estimating the 
following function: 
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where iit is the loan/deposit interest rate spread for firm i at time t; and ROAit is the return on assets, 
which controls the firm’s profitability. 
If banks have been engaging in forbearance lending, α2 would be negative and α3 positive. That is, 
when D/A is small, banks would squeeze loans as D/A increases. However, when D/A exceeds a 
certain level, banks would start to squeeze loans less hard (or would conceivably even increase loans, 
if D/A were sufficiently large). 
This turns out to have been the case for the construction and real estate industries after the bubble 
burst (Figure 9). In the subperiod from FY1993-99, the coefficient on the squared debt/asset ratio is 
positive and significant for the construction and real estate industries, which make up a large share of 
NPLs (Figure 4). This supports the view that banks provided forbearance loans to firms in these 
industries. 
Forbearance lending is supposed to suppress the profitability of Japan’s economy by bailing out 
inefficient firms producing poor returns. Moreover, the theory suggests that not only do inefficient firms  
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survive, but they also reduce their levels of effort since they anticipate that banks will bail them out 
(Berglöf and Roland (1997)). 
In the construction and real estate industries, firms with higher debt/asset ratios or faster loan growth 
are likely to have lower ROA. In Figure 10, ROA is regressed on a cross term comprising loan growth 
and the debt/asset ratio as follows: 
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where shareit denotes firm i’s share of its industry sales. The coefficient on the cross term is negative 
and significant for the construction and real estate industries, to which banks are supposed to have 
provided forbearance loans. This seems to indicate the presence of moral hazard among these firms, 
in the sense of Berglöf and Roland (1997). 
As long as banks continue to provide forbearance loans and do not dispose of their NPLs, the quality 
of their loan portfolios will decline and they themselves will remain vulnerable. 
5. Inefficient  resource  allocation 
So far, we have observed the reluctance of banks to extend credit to potentially profitable firms, thus 
hindering the emergence of more efficient firms (Section 3); and also their reluctance to write off bad 
loans to non-profitable firms, thus securing the survival of inefficient firms (Section 4). Although at first 
sight these two phenomena look quite different, in that one involves failing to expand credit whereas 
the other involves failure to shrink credit, both have the same effect: they prevent credit from shifting to 
relatively efficient sectors. In other words, both the credit crunch and forbearance lending are 
symptoms of the malfunctioning Japanese banking sector. 
In what follows, we provide evidence which supports the view that financial intermediation has indeed 
been weakened since the bubble burst. 
5.1  Tankan survey 
Figure 11 offers evidence from the Tankan’s Diffusion Index of lending attitudes at financial 
institutions. The horizontal axis describes the share of firms replying that lending attitudes are 
“severe”, while the vertical axis gives the share of firms replying that they are “accommodative”. Under 
normal circumstances, we expect the trade-off between the two shares to trace out a curve running 
from southeast to northwest. 
Weakening financial intermediation should be captured in this setting by a northward shift of the curve, 
since the share of firms replying “severe” would not decline even in the face of monetary easing. In an 
analogy with the Beveridge curve for the labour market, an outward shift of the curve implies less 
efficient financial intermediation. 
In fact, there was an apparent northward shift in the curve in the early 1990s. Since then, the curve 
has not shifted back. This indicates a weakening of financial intermediation around the middle of the 
1990s. 
5.2  Sectoral credit shifts 
In order to confirm the above result, we use the following measure to capture credit shifts across 
sectors:
15 
                                                       
15  In fact, the idea of the sectoral shift measure comes from Lilien (1982), who calculates a measure of sectoral labour shifts. 
Lilien uses this measure as a proxy for the size of sectoral shocks.  
































where Lit is outstanding loans to industry i at time t and Lt denotes aggregate outstanding loans at time 
t  ), ( it i t L L Σ =  and ∆4 is the fourth-order difference operator. 
When a large amount of credit is reallocated from one industry to another, σ
L is expected to increase. 
This is because such a reallocation would be expected to increase the dispersion of credit growth 
across sectors, implying a greater difference between ∆4 lnLit and ∆4 lnLt. 
In fact, σ
L declined significantly from the 1980s to the 1990s (Figure 12). Given that sectoral shocks 
increased during the 1990s, as illustrated by another Lilien-type measure based on sectoral job 
vacancies (Osawa et al (2002)), this decline in the sectoral credit shift measure indicates the 
inefficiency of resource allocation through financial intermediation. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have taken stock of related research carried out within the Bank of Japan in order to 
discuss the interrelationship between the increase in NPLs and real economic performance in Japan 
since the 1990s. The main points can be summarised as follows: 
•  The deterioration in firms’ balance sheets due to the collapse of land prices was responsible 
for the increase in NPLs. Cyclical downturns seemed to be also responsible, albeit indirectly, 
in that they increased quasi-NPLs. 
•  The increase in NPLs, in its turn, distorted real economic performance via malfunctioning in 
the banking sector. Both a “credit crunch” and “forbearance lending” took place, and these 
caused a decline, through the banking sector, in the efficiency of its resource allocation. 
In tandem with the government, the Bank of Japan has endeavoured to restore bank health through 
bank supervision. Recent measures include its advocacy of the discounted cash flow) methodology for 
provisioning (Bank of Japan (2002, 2003b)), as well as the purchases of equities from the banking 
sector aimed at reducing banks’ equity exposure and keeping it down at the level of their Tier 1 capital. 
The Bank has also made efforts to strengthen the monetary transmission mechanism. As part of its 
efforts in this direction, the Bank decided to purchase asset-backed securities. 
As a next step, we believe that more research investigating the process of asset price deflation is 
warranted. The research reviewed in this paper gives us to understand that the fall in land prices was 
responsible for the increase in NPLs that ended up suppressing the real growth of Japan’s economy. 
However, we do not know why land prices fell so far. Although the fall in land prices is generally 
thought to have reflected the bursting of the bubble as well as ongoing structural changes (eg rapid 
ageing, hollowing out, etc), we do not have any quantitative sense of the extent of each factor’s 
contribution. 
We also believe that more work is needed on banks’ profitability, since bank health cannot be restored 
unless banks become reasonably profitable. Uncovering the causes of banks’ currently low profitability 
is vital. The weakness of the real economy, excessive competition due to overbanking, competition 
from government financial institutions and problems in bank management are often cited as reasons 
for low profits, and sensible policymaking requires a clear ranking of the degree to which each of these 
is responsible.  
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Figure 1 
Non-performing loan classifications in Japan 
At end-March 2003, in trillions of yen 
Risk management loans    Loans disclosed under the 
Financial Reconstruction Law 
  Loans subject to  
self-assessment 




Loans to borrowers 
in bankruptcy  2.2     
 
Unrecoverable or  
valueless loans  5.7 
 
Bankrupt, 
de facto bankrupt  5.7 
Past due loans  15.9 




Loans in arrears by 
three months or more  0.5 
Need attention 
Restructured loans  16.2 
  Loans requiring 






           
71.4 
          Normal 371.7 
 
Total 34.8    Total 35.3    Sub  total  90.1 
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Figure 2 
Definitions of non-performing loan classifications 
(1) Risk management loans 
Loans to borrowers in bankruptcy  Loans where interest is not collected because borrowers are in 
bankruptcy. 
Past due loans  Loans where interest is not collected, excluding those 
categorised above. 
Loans in arrears by three months or more  Loans where principal or interest is in arrears by three months or 
more from the due date specified in the related loan agreement. 
Restructured loans  Loans for which the bank has provided more favourable terms 
and conditions to the borrower than those in the original 
agreement, with the aim of providing restructuring support. 
These include reducing interest rates, rescheduling interest and 
principal payments, or waiving claims on the borrower. 
(2) Loans disclosed under the Financial Reconstruction Law 
Bankrupt  Loans to borrowers who are legally or formally bankrupt, or 
virtually bankrupt borrowers with no prospects of resuscitation. 
(These correspond to loans categorised in the self-assessment 
as “bankrupt” and “de facto bankrupt”.) 
De facto bankrupt  Loans to borrowers who have not gone bankrupt but are in 
financial difficulties, and thus whose lenders are unlikely to 
receive the principal and interest concerned on due dates. (They 
correspond to loans categorised in the self-assessment as “in 
danger of bankruptcy”.) 
In danger of bankruptcy  “Loans in arrears by three months or more” and “restructured 
loans”. (The definitions of these are the same as under risk 
management loans.) 
(3) Loans subject to self-assessment 
Bankrupt  Legally or formally bankrupt borrowers who are in the 
bankruptcy/liquidation process; who have filed for bankruptcy 
under the Commercial Law, the Corporation Reorganization Law 
or the Civil Rehabilitation Law; or whose deals are suspended at 
the clearing house. 
De facto bankrupt  Borrowers who have serious financial difficulties with no 
prospect of resuscitation. Typically, they are seriously 
undercapitalised or have debt overdue for a long time. Although 
they are not legally or formally bankrupt, they are deemed 
bankrupt in practice. 
In danger of bankruptcy  Borrowers who have financial difficulties and are likely to go 
bankrupt in the future. Typically, they are undercapitalised. 
Need attention  Borrowers who have problems with interest payments or 
amortisation; or borrowers who record losses. 
Need special attention  Borrowers all or part of whose debts are categorised as “loans 
requiring special attention” under FRL classified loans. 
Normal  Borrowers who do not have particular problems. 
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Figure 3 












“Partial direct write-offs” introduced.
Disclosure of “loans to borrowers in  
bankruptcy” and “past due loans”.  
(Based on the standards for  
disclosure issued by the Japanese  
Bankers Association.) 
Disclosure of “loans with reduced  
interest” and “loans with the aim of  
providing restructuring support to  
borrowers”. 
Disclosure of “risk management 
loans”. (“Loans in arrears by 3 months
or more” and “restructured loans”.)  
Disclosure of “risk management loans” 
legislated. (Along with disclosure 
under the Banking Law. Disclosure 
was also made on a consolidated 
basis. Another new standard
1 was 
introduced.) 
Clarification of the definition of  
“restructured loans”. 
Disclosure under the Financial 
Reconstruction Law. (For 
cooperative financial institutions.)
Disclosure under the Financial 
Reconstruction Law. (For 
regional banks.)
Disclosure under the Financial 
Reconstruction Law. (For major 
banks.)
“Financial Inspection Manual” 
implemented. (Accuracy of    
self-assessment improved.)   
Trial self-assessment by banks. 
(Ministry of Finance disclosed  
aggregate figure for classified loans.)
Risk management loans 
 
Loans disclosed under the 
Financial Reconstruction Law
Loans subject to  
self-assessment 
Banks broadened their definitions of “restructured loans” independently.
 
1  Coverage of “past due loans” was extended, ie loans to borrowers “in danger of bankruptcy” must be included within “past 
due loans” even if they are not overdue.  
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Figure 4 
Breakdown of NPLs by industry 
(1) Risk management loans 
     
11.4%     27.2%     16.9% 18.2% 11.7% 3.2%    
2.8%    
8.5%    
0%     20%     40% 60% 80% 100%
Construction     Wholesale and retail Real estate     Services Manufacturing    
Transport, information    
and communication    
Finance   and 
insurance    
Others    
 
 
(2) Overall loans and discounts outstanding 
 
4.8%  12.0%  12.6% 12.8%  13.3% 5.2% 8.9% 30.3% 
0%     20%     40% 60% 80% 100%
Construction  Wholesale and retail  Manufacturing Others 
Real estate  Services 
Transport, information 
and communication 




(3) Gross domestic product 
 
12.8%  13.4%  19.9% 19.8% 6.1% 6.4%  14.9% 
0%  20%  40% 60% 80% 100%
Construction  Wholesale and retail 
Real estate 







Notes: 1. Risk management loans and overall loans and discounts outstanding are as of March 2003. Gross domestic 
product is as of FY2001. 2. Risk management loans are those disclosed by 13 major banks, ie city banks, long-term credit 
banks and trust banks, and 73 regional banks. They are based on banking accounts and trust accounts of domestic 
branches; unconsolidated data with some exceptions using consolidated data. 
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Figure 5 
Land investment by industry 
    
–     2    
–     1    
0    
1    
2    
3    
4    
1970     72     74  76     78     80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94     9     6     98     00  FY
trillion yen    
Manufacturing    
Other non-manufacturing    
Construction, real estate and trading houses 
  
 
Source: Tachibana and Sekine (2003). 
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Figure 6 
Estimation results for investment function 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent  I/K–1  I/K–1 
Bond issue  Yes No 
Bank info  Yes Yes 
I–1 /K–2   –0.01  (0.04)    0.001  (0.04) 
∆y   0.04  (0.04)   0.03  (0.05) 
∆y–1   0.09  (0.04)**  0.01  (0.04) 
(k – y)–2   –0.08  (0.04)**   –0.07  (0.04)* 
y–2   0.00  (0.01)    –0.05  (0.03) 
∆j    –0.06  (0.02)***   –0.10  (0.03)*** 
∆j–1   –0.07  (0.03)***   –0.08  (0.03)** 
j–2   –0.07  (0.04)*   –0.11  (0.06) 
CF/(p
k K)–1   –0.05  (0.07)    0.11  (0.07) 
(D/A) –1   –0.16  (0.05)***   –0.25  (0.09)*** 
Cap   0.07  (0.15)   0.56  (0.26)** 
    
Sample period  1993-2000 1993-2000 
Observations  6,871 1,617 
Firms  856 222 
σ  0.086 0.096 
Sargan   123.9  [0.10]    141.1  [0.28] 
AR(2)   –0.33  [0.74]    –0.51  [0.61] 
Notes: 1.  System GMM estimation (unbalanced panel). Coefficients on constants and time dummies are omitted. 
2. Estimated coefficients are obtained from two-step estimators. Figures in parentheses are standard errors from two-step 
estimators with the Windmeijer small sample corrections. “***”, “**” and “*” denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 3.  AR(2) is a test for second-order residual serial correlation (the null hypothesis is no serial 
correlation). Sargan is a test for over-identifying restrictions (the null hypothesis is to satisfy over-identification). Figures in 
squared brackets are p-values. 4. Instruments for first-differenced equations are (It–2/Kt–3),…, (It–9/Kt–10),…, ∆yt–2, ∆yt–3, (D/A)t–1, 
(D/A)t–2, ∆jt, ∆jt–1, Capt, Capt–1. Those for level equations are ∆(It–1/Kt–2). For column (2), ∆yt–4,…, t–9 are added as instruments 
for the first-differenced equation. 
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Figure 7 
Contribution of balance sheet condition to I/K–1 
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Figure 8 
Correlations between loan growth and call rate 
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Figure 9 











(A) Sample period: 1993-99 
l –1    0.94 (0.02)***    0.97 (0.10)    0.97 (0.03) 
r    0.12 (0.05)**    0.14 (0.08)*    0.04 (0.03) 
(D/A)–1    –0.12 (0.99)    –3.41 (1.76)*    –1.31 (1.12) 
(D/A)
2
–1    –0.75 (2.11)    3.23 (1.94)*    2.02 (1.68) 
ROA–1    0.003 (0.01)    0.05 (0.03)    0.001 (0.02) 
Observations 3,072  408  1,160 
Firms 384  51  145 
σ  0.06 0.09 0.05 
AR(2)    0.46 [0.65]    –1.37 [0.17]    –0.28 [0.78] 
Sargan   112.7  [0.16]    37.4    [1.00]   116.3  [0.11] 
(B) Sample period: 1986-92 
l –1    0.98 (0.02)    0.96 (0.05)***    0.98 (0.03)*** 
r    0.06 (0.02)    0.12 (0.03)***    0.10 (0.03)*** 
(D/A)–1    –2.44 (1.49)    –3.51 (1.97)*    0.52 (1.20) 
(D/A)
2
–1    4.07 (3.25)    4.40 (3.60)    –1.90 (1.82) 
ROA –1    –0.01 (0.01)    0.01 (0.02)    –0.01 (0.01) 
Observations 3,072  408  1,160 
Firms 384  51  145 
σ  0.07 0.07 0.05 
AR(2)    0.10 [0.92]    –1.61 [0.11]    0.69 [0.49] 
Sargan    125.2 [0.04]    36.64 [1.00]    111.2 [0.19] 
Notes: 1. System GMM estimation (balanced panel). Coefficients on constants and time dummies are omitted. 2. Estimated 
coefficients are obtained from two-step estimators. Figures in parentheses are standard errors from two-step estimators with 
the Windmeijer small sample corrections. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 3.  AR(2) is a test for second-order residual serial correlation, obtained from one-step estimators (the null 
hypothesis is no serial correlation). Sargan is a test for over-identifying restrictions (the null hypothesis is to satisfy over-
identification). Figures in squared brackets are p-values. 4. Instruments for first-differenced equations are It–2,…,t–5, Kt,…,t–5, 
(D/A)t–2,…,t–5, and ROAt–2,…,t–5. Those for level equations are ∆It–1, ∆(D/A)t–1, and ∆ROAt–1. 
  














ROA–1    0.54 (0.12)    0.73 (0.16)    0.83 (0.15) 
∆l (D/A)–1    –0.88 (1.23)    –2.56 (1.10)**    0.33 (0.92) 
∆Share    3.49 (1.61)    –3.37 (1.91)*    0.70 (0.57) 
Sample period  1993-99  1993-99  1993-99 
Observations 3,072  408  1,160 
Firms 384  51  145 
σ  4.18 1.45  1.67 
AR(2)    0.68 [0.50]    1.19 [0.23]    –0.32 [0.75] 
Sargan    26.2 [0.07]    19.2 [0.32]    22.0 [0.19] 
Notes: 1. System GMM estimation (balanced panel). Coefficients on constants and time dummies are omitted. 2. Estimated 
coefficients are obtained from two-step estimators. Figures in parentheses are standard errors from two-step estimators with 
the Windmeijer small sample corrections. “***”, “**”, and “*” denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 3.  AR(2) is a test for second-order residual serial correlation, obtained from one-step estimators (the null 
hypothesis is no serial correlation). Sargan is a test for over-identifying restrictions (the null hypothesis is to satisfy over-
identification). Figures in squared brackets are p-values. 4. Instruments for first-differenced equations are ROAt–2, ROAt–3,
∆It–1, ∆It–2, (D/A)t–1, (D/A)t–2, and Sharet. Those for level equations are ∆ROAt–1, ∆It–1, (D/A)t–1, (D/A)t–2, and Sharet. 
 
Figure 11 


















Source: Bank of Japan, “Tankan short-term economic survey of enterprises in Japan”.  
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Figure 12 











78   80   82   84   86  88  90  92  94  96  98   00  02   
Notes: 1. σ
L is calculated from 22 industries using data from Loans and Discounts Outstanding 
by Industry (Bank of Japan) from 1978 Q2 to 2002 Q4. 2. Current account overdrafts were not 
included in the series up to 1992 Q1, but have been included since then. 3.  The figure for 
FY1993 is obtained from a linear interpolation of σ
L in 1992 Q1 and in 1993 Q2. 
 
Figure 13 
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Urban land price index
Hedonic price index (judicial auction prices) 
 
Source: Saita (2003).  
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